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Japan in the “Global War for Talent”: 
Changing Concepts of Valuable Foreign Workers 
and Their Consequences  
David Chiavacci 
Summary 
In recent years, under the influence of the “global war for talent,” labor immigration 
policies in more developed economies (MDE) have been characterized by a 
dichotomization regarding foreign workers’ skills. While the immigration of highly 
skilled foreign workers is now being actively promoted, low-skilled immigration is 
being curbed by increasingly restrictive regulations. According to official immigration 
policy, Japan is an example par excellence of this pattern among MDE. However, in 
contradiction to its official immigration policy and like many other MDE, Japan has 
been experiencing a continuous inflow of non-highly skilled foreign workers and is 
structurally dependent on them today. This paper analyzes changing concepts of 
valuable foreign workers in Japan over the last three decades and their 
consequences. Who exactly a “valuable” foreign worker is is a highly contested 
question. It lies at the heart of Japan’s immigration policy debates and is embedded 
in changing ideational perceptions of immigration. Three reform periods in 
immigration policy and their long-term consequences are analyzed here: (1) the plan 
for increasing the number of foreign students as part of Japan’s internationalization in 
the 1980s; (2) the first reform debate in reaction to new irregular immigration around 
1990; and (3) the second reform debate in view of Japan’s long-term demographic 
development in recent years. 
Keywords: Japan, immigration, immigration policy, highly skilled workers, foreign 
students, foreign trainees, nikkeijin, entertainer visa 
1. Introduction 
We are currently living in the age of the “global war for talent.” Highly skilled 
workers are a crucial resource needed in order to survive in the face of worldwide 
competition. Companies and governments are forced to seek them regardless of their 
nationality or ethnicity. Certain experts want us to believe this, at least, and their 
efforts have been very successful so far (Brown and Tannock 2009: 378–382). 
Promoting the Anglo-Saxon economies as models worth copying, their argument 
has been especially influential in continental Europe in recent years (Doomernik, 
Koslowski and Thränhardt 2009: 4–7). In Japan, too, the importance of accepting 
highly skilled foreign workers is common sense in policy making (Iguchi 2001: 18; 
Kamibayashi 2006: 172).  
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This “global war for talent” has led to an increasing convergence in the immigration 
policies of more developed economies (MDE). In a general perspective, labor 
immigration policies in MDE are characterized by a dichotomization regarding 
foreign workers’ skills. Highly skilled workers are welcome, and many governments 
have introduced new programs and legislation aiming to increase their intake.1 In 
contrast, foreign workers who are not considered to be skilled enough are being 
prevented from immigrating by ever-more restrictive regulations. According to 
official statements and the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act 
(ICRRA, Shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei-hō), Japan is an example of this 
par excellence, for its basic immigration policy is to encourage highly skilled 
foreign workers to come and live in the country and to ban any other foreign 
workers whose skills are of little benefit. 
The economic rationale for a pro-active, high-skill immigration policy is that the 
economic and fiscal benefits are higher than the costs. In contrast, unskilled foreign 
workers not only cause higher costs than benefits, but their inflow also hinders 
innovation and productivity. Because employers can rely on low-paid, unskilled 
foreign workers, they have no incentive to invest in new technologies and training. 
Immigration of unskilled foreign workers is also said to have adverse effects on the 
native workforce. These arguments may be rather too simple, however (Ruhs 2008: 
407–408); the economic and fiscal effects of immigration are still contested among 
specialists. Empirical research and complex economic model calculations have led 
to contradicting results (Borjas 2003; Card 2001). Moreover, despite their 
increasingly restrictive low-skill immigration policies, most MDE have a continuous 
inflow of non-highly skilled foreign workers. In fact, many MDE are structurally 
dependent on foreign workers who are willing to take on those jobs that are shunned 
by native workers. Again, Japan is a prime example of this contradiction between 
official immigration policy and actual immigration movements. Today, about 80 
percent of all foreign workers in Japan work in jobs that the ICRRA defines as low 
skilled—and from which foreign workers are officially excluded (Bungei Shunjū 
2008: 295).  
This paper analyzes changing concepts of valuable foreign workers in Japan over the 
last three decades and their consequences. Who exactly a “valuable” foreign worker 
is is a highly contested question. It lies at the heart of Japan’s immigration policy 
debates and is embedded in changing ideational perceptions of immigration. Three 
reform periods in immigration policy and their long-term consequences are 
analyzed: (1) the plan to increase the number of foreign students as part of Japan’s 
internationalization efforts in the 1980s; (2) the first reform debate in reaction to 
new irregular immigration around 1990; and (3) the second reform debate in view of 
                                                
1  Beyond these general congruencies, recent research has identified variations in the high-skill 
immigration policy of MDE according to differences in their political economy (Cerna 2009; Menz 
2011). 
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Japan’s long-term demographic development in recent years. Before going into 
these points, an overview will be given of recent immigration to Japan and the 
contradiction between the country’s official immigration policy and what has 
actually been happening among migrants.  
2. Japan: A New Immigration Country 
For many decades, migration specialists pointed to Japan as a textbook example of a 
non-immigration country with a very restrictive immigration policy and no 
significant immigration movements to speak of (Bartram 2000; Zolberg 1989: 405). 
Japan was transformed into an immigration country in the second half of the 1980s, 
however. Due to new immigration movements, the number of foreign residents 
started to increase significantly (see Figure 1). Although the share of foreign 
residents is still small in an international comparison, namely about 1.7 percent, this 
figure has more than doubled in the last twenty years. According to the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2008: 49), Japan is one of the 
most important migration destinations among MDE measured in terms of the net 
inflow of immigrants per year. 
Figure 1: Registered Foreign Residents in Japan, 1975–2010 
Source: MOJ (1975–2011) 
These new immigration flows led to heated debates about immigration and 
immigration policy in Japan. By analyzing the number of articles on immigration 
published in the two daily newspapers with the largest circulation (Asahi Shimbun 
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and Yomiuri Shimbun) and the leading daily economic newspaper (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun), two public debates can be distinguished: a first debate around the year 
1990 in view of new immigration and a second debate from the late 1990s up to the 
economic crisis that started in 2008. The second debate can be separated into a 
preliminary phase up to 2004 and a main phase from about 2004 onwards (Figure 2). 
In reaction to new immigration movements, the average number of articles on 
immigration published each year sky-rocketed from approx. 85 (1985–1987) to over 
720 (1988–1993) in the three newspapers. However, after the collapse of Japan’s 
bubble economy in the early 1990s, public debate on immigration faded 
significantly, the number of printed articles plunging to around 250 (1994–1999). 
Although Japan’s economic stagnation continued up to 2003, public debate on 
immigration already started to intensify again around the year 2000. In the period 
from 2000 to 2005, some 300 articles on immigration were published every year. 
The main phase in this second immigration debate started, however, after the return 
to economic growth in 2003/2004. In the period from 2006 to 2009, nearly 490 
articles on immigration were published per year. The latest economic recession, 
which is due to worldwide financial and economic problems and has lasted since 
2008, has led to a decrease in the public debate on immigration; the number of 
articles on immigration has been dropping since 2010 (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Newspaper Articles about Immigration and Foreign Workers, 
1985–2011 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on research with the keywords “foreign worker”  
(gaikokujin rōdōsha) and “multicultural society” (tabunka kyōsei) in the electronic databases 
Kikuzō (Asahi Shimbun), Nikkei Telekom 21 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun) and Yomidas Rekishitan 
(Yomiuri Shimbun). 
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These two main debate periods are also identifiable in immigration policy making. 
In Table 1, the number of substantial reform proposals in immigration policy by 
political parties and politicians, ministries and state institutions and interest groups is 
listed from 1984 to 2008. The average number of proposals per year more than 
doubled in the years of the first immigration debate (1989–1993) in comparison to 
the five-year period before that (1984–1988). However, immigration policy 
disappeared almost completely from the policy-making agenda between 1994 and 
1998, with only one substantial proposal being recorded. While the second 
immigration debate was not as intense in public as the first immigration debate, in 
policy-making circles the intensity significantly increased from the late 1990s 
onwards: from 1999 to 2003, the number of proposals per year increased by a 
stunning 19 times. And during the main phase of the second immigration debate 
(2004–2008), it increased again by about 80 percent. During this period, a 
substantial new proposal was published once every two months, which is three times 
as many substantial proposals in comparison to the first immigration debate (1989–
1993). Since 2008, immigration policy has been fading from the policy-making 
agenda again. The new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), for 
example, has not published a single substantial proposal on immigration policy since 
taking power in September 2009. 
Table 1: Substantial Reform Proposals in Immigration Policy, 1984–2008 
Period Number of proposals 
Average number  
of proposals per annum 
Change in relation to the  
previous period 
1984–1988 5 1.0 – 
1989–1993 11 2.2 +120 % 
1994–1998 1 0.2 -92 % 
1999–2003 19 3.8 +1800 % 
2004–2008 34 6.4 +79 % 
Source: NDL (2008: 195–204) for 1984–2007; the author’s own compilation for 2008 
Despite some fundamental and even revolutionary reform proposals during these 
two debates, which will be discussed in detail below, the basic framework of Japan’s 
immigration policy has not officially changed; it is still based on the principle that 
only highly skilled foreign workers should be admitted to Japan. The ICRRA 
includes a list of occupations in which highly skilled foreign workers are accepted. 
Immigrants are not granted a working visa for any other jobs. Hence, Japanese 
legislation defines a positive list of foreign professionals and excludes all other 
foreign workers. However, in clear contradiction to this basic principle and the 
ICRRA, four-fifths of all foreign workers in Japan are not actually active in any of 
these occupational fields at all, but have less-skilled jobs (Bungei Shunjū 2008: 
295). In fact, Japan’s economy has become structurally dependent on non-highly 
skilled foreign labor. Today, not only low-pay sectors with bad working conditions 
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that are shunned by the native workforce are structurally dependent on foreign 
workers, but Japan’s export industries are as well (Chiavacci 2011: 159–174). 
Despite their only constituting a small share of the labor market, non-highly skilled 
foreign workers are now an indispensable part of Japan’s car and consumer 
electronics industries. 
3. Foreign Students: Japan’s Expansionist Policy and Its 
Unintended Consequences 
Before analyzing the changing concepts of foreign workers’ value in Japan’s 
immigration debates, the nation’s expansionist policy regarding foreign students and 
the consequences it has had need to be considered. In the 1980s, Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone (who served from 1982 to 1987) formulated Japan’s 
internationalization (kokusaika) as a central national goal (Scolinos 1988). On the 
one hand, this new policy was a reaction to the increasing amount of “Japan-
bashing” on the West’s part, especially by the U.S., which criticized Japan as a “free 
rider” of the international trade and security system. On the other hand, it was also 
an effort to make Japan fit for its increasing international role in view of its growing 
amount of foreign direct investment and political relevance in the international 
community. The plan to allow 100,000 foreign students into Japan was a central 
element of this policy agenda. These foreign students were expected to return home 
upon graduation and act as bridgeheads facilitating Japan’s economic and political 
outreach.  
The origin of this plan was Nakasone’s official trip to Southeast Asia in May 1983. 
When he asked former exchange students who had studied in Japan if they planned 
to send their own children to Japanese universities one day, he was shocked to hear 
their negative answers (Tanaka 1995: 182). Although the slogan had not yet been 
born, in Nakasone’s view, Japan was losing in the “global war for talent.” Upon his 
return, he immediately started to personally take care of the internationalization of 
Japan’s higher-education system. He formed a political commission for foreign 
students in the 21st century under his direct leadership. In June 1984, the government 
adopted the Plan to Accept 100,000 International Students (Ryūgakusei ukeire 
10man nin Keikaku) based on the recommendations made by this body. The number 
of foreign students was meant to quadruple to 40,000 in 1992 and further increase to 
100,000 by 2000 (Tanaka 1995: 184). According to the plan, the large majority of 
these foreign students would come from developing countries and finance their 
studies in Japan themselves. Hence, foreign holders of student visas were granted 
permission to work up to twenty hours per week in order to cover their daily 
expenses and pay for tuition. Moreover, prospective foreign students were granted 
the opportunity to study at private Japanese language schools in order to prepare for 
the entrance exams held by higher education institutions. The procedure for 
obtaining a visa as a college or pre-college student was greatly simplified. From 
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May 1987 onwards, educational institutions were also allowed to serve as guarantors 
for foreign college and pre-college students (Ishikawa 2006: 10–11). 
The implementation of the Plan to Accept 100,000 International Students had 
unintended consequences, however, for it led to a surge of non-highly skilled foreign 
workers into Japan. While the number of college students entering Japan increased 
from about 4,000 in 1984 to 6,000 in 1986, the number of pre-college students 
entering Japan more than tripled, rising from about 4,000 in 1984 to around 12,500 
in 1986. Due to the fact that Japanese language schools could act as guarantors, the 
number of foreign pre-college students entering Japan nearly tripled again to over 
35,000 in 1988 (MOJ 1975–2011). This boom in foreign pre-college students, 
especially from the southern regions of the People’s Republic of China, was not due 
to the interest these immigrants had in entering a higher-education institution, but 
due to their interest in working in Japan. The large majority of them were de facto 
guest workers active in badly paid, low-skill jobs who wished to save their earnings 
and eventually take them back home with them. New income opportunities due to 
the reforms were also quickly capitalized on the Japanese side. The number of 
private Japanese language schools increased more than sixfold from 49 in 1984 to 
309 in 1988 (Tanaka 1995: 190). Many operators of these newly founded schools 
were not interested in offering good language tuition to studious students, but were 
fully willing to act as guarantors for foreign students and to overlook absenteeism 
from school as long as these “students” paid their school fees. Some impostors even 
acted as intermediaries for non-existing Japanese language schools and claimed 
large brokerage fees. In October 1988, Chinese who had been deceived by such 
imposers demonstrated in front of the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai.  
In view of these problems and a potential increase in the number of foreign pre-
college students, the Japanese authorities decided to take action. They started to 
regulate language schools more strictly and checked students’ visa applications 
again more carefully. The increase in foreign pre-college students ended as suddenly 
as it had started in the early 1990s (Figure 3). However, the number of foreign 
college students also stagnated in the 1990s, remaining at a level of approx. 60,000 
students (Figure 3). The goal of accepting 100,000 foreign students by the year 2000 
receded into the distance. In the late 1990s, the Japanese authorities therefore took 
new measures to simplify the immigration procedure for foreign students and to 
increase their working opportunities (Ishikawa 2006: 14–15). Subsequently, the 
number of foreign students started to increase again. The numerical goal of 100,000 
students was eventually reached in 2002, with a lag of two years (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Foreign College and Pre-college Students, 1984–2010 
Source: MOJ (1975–2011) 
In July 2008, the Japanese government adopted a new plan concerning foreign 
students in the context of the second immigration debate (MEXT et al. 2008): the 
number of foreign students was to be further increased to 300,000 by the year 2020 
(300,000 International Students Plan, Ryūgakusei 30man nin Keikaku). Moreover, 
unlike the plan of the 1980s, the large majority of these students were to stay and 
work in Japan after graduation. It would be too simple to describe these foreign 
students and graduates as prime examples of highly skilled foreign workers, 
however. In order to finance their studies, many of them work in low-skill jobs in 
the service sector. In urban Japan, many restaurants, cafés and convenience stores 
(konbini) would no longer be in business today if it were not for the foreign students 
they employ (Asahi Shimbun 2006/08/05; Nikkei Bijinesu 2006). Research on 
Chinese students in Japan—who are by far the largest ethnic group, making up two-
thirds of all the foreign students in the country (MOJ 1975–2011)—shows that upon 
graduation many of them have to content themselves with a job in a small Japanese 
company, with little remuneration or long-term employment security and poor 
career prospects (Liu-Farrer 2011: 100–101). Large, well-known Japanese 
companies, in contrast, prefer to hire Japanese graduates and do not rely on foreign 
students as a source of global talent.  
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4. The First Immigration Debate: 
“Simple” Workers Are Unwelcome (with a Few Exceptions) 
Foreign “students” were not the only new inflow that led to the transformation of 
Japan into an immigration country. In the late 1980s, irregular immigration started to 
increase as well. The number of immigrants who were registered as overstaying 
their visa multiplied and reached approx. 100,000 persons in 1989, 160,000 persons 
in 1991 and nearly 280,000 persons in 1992 (Tanaka 1995: 221). While the increase 
in the number of foreign “students” was a result of policy reforms (which was 
partially unintended), the increasing amount of irregular immigration was not due to 
any change in immigration policy. The main factors that led to this rise were the 
labor shortage in Japan during the bubble economy and, first and foremost, the 
institutionalization of East Asia as a migration region and Japan’s embeddedness 
herein. Japan had actually experienced a much more severe labor shortage at the end 
of its high-growth era around 1970, but this had not resulted in irregular 
immigration. At the time, East Asia was still a non-migration region and Japan was 
regionally rather isolated. In the late 1980s, however, Japan was strongly linked to 
East Asia and international migration had been re-established as a behavioral pattern 
in the region (Chiavacci 2005). Hence, Japan’s renewed labor shortage triggered an 
inflow of foreign workers, who usually entered with a tourist visa and then 
deliberately overstayed it.  
As seen in section 2, this new bout of irregular immigration led to a huge public and 
political debate about immigration and immigration policy. The main question was 
how Japan should react in view of the new, ongoing immigration. A general 
consensus emerged that the categories for highly skilled foreign workers should be 
amended in the ICRRA in order to attract more foreign professionals. The question 
of whether to accept other types of foreign workers as well, who were referred to as 
“simple workers” (tanjun rōdōsha) in the debate, grew highly controversial (Chūō 
Kōron 1987; Nishiō 1989). The debate was embedded in two major discussions: 
first, the pros and cons of admitting foreign workers were discussed from a labor 
market perspective, namely what the consequences would be of accepting 
(“simple”) foreign workers, and second, how Japan should react to increasing 
international immigration in view of its role as a contributing member of the 
international community. So perspectives on Japan’s international role and duties 
also influenced the debate. 
The first immigration debate was marked by conflicting positions, but also by the 
absence of many actors whom one would have expected to participate in such 
discussions (Chiavacci 2011: 116–123). The main political actors in this debate were 
ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) argued from a foreign policy 
perspective and in view of the international criticism of Japan acting as a “free rider” 
in the international systems. According to MOFA, it was time for Japan to overcome 
its egoistic stance and take on its international role. Being a more developed 
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economy, Japan had the duty to contribute to the economic development of less 
developed East Asian economies by accepting their “simple workers”, so it was 
argued. It has always been a normal development in human history for workers from 
less developed regions to emigrate to better developed regions. Japan, one of the 
leading MDE worldwide, could no longer act as if it was an isolated island. The 
Ministry of Labour (MOL),2 on the other hand, was in favor of maintaining a 
restrictive immigration policy. From a labor market perspective, it argued that the 
acceptance of “simple workers” was never fully controllable, it would lead to higher 
costs than benefits, and it would have negative impacts on Japanese workers as well. 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ), which is in charge of immigration policy, also 
argued in favor of maintaining a restrictive immigration policy and against admitting 
“simple workers.” Various other government bodies also took a clear position in the 
debate. The Economic Planning Agency and the Ministry of Transport (MOT) both 
took a pro stance, for instance, while the Ministry of Construction (MOC) adopted a 
contra stance on accepting “simple workers.” The Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI)3 did not take a clear stance itself due to internal factions 
disagreeing on the issue of accepting such workers. The Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP)—the dominating party in power for decades—was conspicuously absent in 
the debate and did not take a clear public stance either, as it was internally split 
concerning the immigration issue. Almost all the other parties also took ambivalent 
positions due to internal differences. In fact, only the Japanese Communist Party 
(JCP) had a clear stance—in favor of admitting “simple workers.” As for the various 
interest groups, the Japan Business Federation, Keidanren—the most influential 
economic interest group of all—was also practically absent from the debate; it 
published a position paper in favor of accepting more foreign workers only at the 
very end of the first immigration debate. Labor unions and Japan’s employer 
association Nikkeiren were of the same opinion for once, opposing any admittance 
of “simple workers.” Still, in view of the severe labor shortage, the influential 
business association Keizai Dōyūkai and the associations of small and medium-size 
enterprises (SME) were in favor of a fundamental reform and of opening the 
Japanese labor market to “simple workers” from abroad as well as to more highly 
skilled persons.  
Representative surveys conducted by the Cabinet Office in Japan (CAO, Naikakufu) 
during the first debate document a relatively positive attitude among Japan’s 
population regarding the immigration of foreign laborers—even “simple workers” 
(Figure 4). Fewer than one in four respondents felt that foreign workers should not 
be admitted without any high skills. More than half of the persons questioned were 
in favor of accepting “simple workers” under certain conditions. In fact, a general 
                                                
2  The MOL was merged with the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 2001 and is now named the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.  
3  In 2001 the MITI was merged with other government agencies to form the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI). 
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consensus existed among the population that a fundamental reform was necessary in 
immigration policy that included the admittance of “simple workers.” 
Figure 4: Preferences Regarding the Admittance of “Simple Workers,”  
1988, 1990 and 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CAO (1988, 1991, 2001) 
Overall, as in many MDE, the first immigration debate concerning “simple workers” 
was marked by coalitions of strange bedfellows who normally would not share 
policy positions. The MOFA, MOT, Economic Planning Agency, JCP, associations 
of SME and Keizai Dōyūkai were all in favor of opening Japan to “simple workers.” 
Those who were against this idea included the MOL, MOJ, MOC, labor unions and 
Nikkeiren. Moreover, due to internal antagonism, many influential political actors 
like the LDP, Keidanren and MITI did not position themselves clearly in the debate. 
In view of this initial point, one would have expected a clash in the policy-making 
process between the two coalitions for and against accepting “simple workers.” 
However, the main clash in policy making was actually between the MOL and MOJ. 
The fierce public conflict between these two ministries was not about their policy 
goals, which were actually very similar, but about the control of immigration policy 
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as a policy field. According to the MOJ, the MOL had invaded “its” immigration 
policy field with its proposal to introduce an employer permit system.4  
The coalitions of those groups who supported an opening of the Japanese labor 
market soon came to realize that in view of the missing support of such influential 
actors as the LDP and MITI, they had no chance of overcoming the resistance to 
admitting “simple workers.” Thanks to the conflict and distrust between the MOL 
and MOJ, however, they were able to steer the policy-making process in their own 
direction in several instances. Overall, a highly complex and convoluted policy-
making process emerged, which resulted in two major reforms: (1) a reform of the 
ICRRA; and (2) an expansion and remodeling of the foreign trainee programs 
(Chiavacci 2011: 123–146). 
The reform of the ICRRA included an enlargement of the categories of highly 
skilled foreign workers who were able to obtain a working visa. This led to a 
significant increase in the number of highly qualified foreign workers relocating to 
Japan. Excluding foreign workers with an entertainer visa, the number of foreign 
workers with a working visa increased from over 60,000 in 1992 to over 100,000 in 
2000 and more than 200,000 in 2008 (MOJ 1975–2011). Nonetheless, this 
development did not match the high expectations of the Japanese authorities and 
private industries (Kamibayashi 2006: 171; Kuwahara 2005: 39–40). The share of 
highly qualified foreign workers as a percentage of the whole foreign population of 
2.1 million in Japan still does not exceed eight percent, which is why Japan is not 
regarded as a successful player in the “global war for talent.” 
Moreover, the two large reforms of the first immigration debate also resulted in two 
important side doors opening for foreign workers in jobs that were not defined as 
highly skilled by the ICRRA. The new ICRRA included exceptional treatment of 
nikkeijin, that is Japanese emigrants and their descendants up to the third generation. 
They were granted the right to come back to Japan with a special visa, which 
allowed them to take up any kind of job. This exceptional treatment was proposed 
by the MOJ and was not actually intended as a labor market policy at all (Chiavacci 
2011: 128–133; Kajita 2002: 21–25). However, it resulted in a significant return 
migration of nikkeijin to Japan: their number tripled to approx. 75,000 in 1990 and 
continued to increase over time, rising to over 175,000 in 1992, to over 250,000 in 
1998 and reaching over 350,000 in 2005 (MOJ 1975–2011). The large majority of 
these nikkeijin are indirectly employed as temporary blue-collar workers in low-skill 
jobs in the Japanese export industry. Over the last decade, they have become a 
crucial factor in increasing the flexibility of the production systems of Japan’s 
consumer electronics and car industries and contributed to the renewal of Japan as 
an industrial production site between 2003 and 2008. As Chieko Kamibayashi 
                                                
4  The MOL proposed to introduce an employer permit system, which was to be controlled by the local 
employment offices of the MOL, instead of a worker permit system for foreign workers  
(1988: 43–44). Such a system would have had the advantage of being much easier to control. 
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(2004: 66) accurately points out, their example contradicts the currently dominant 
perspective on low-skilled foreign workers and productivity. It is normally argued 
that low-skilled foreign workers are used as cheap labor in internationally 
uncompetitive sectors and hinder technological innovation and rising productivity. 
However, the temporary and highly flexible nikkeijin workforce is of central 
importance to Japan’s export industries and contributes to their international 
competitiveness. Even so, the economic recession has hit Japan’s export industries 
especially hard since 2008 and has caused many nikkeijin employed as temporary 
workers to be laid off. Their number dropped to less than 300,000 in 2010, and 
many of them have since returned to South America (MOJ 1975–2011). 
A second side door opened by the reforms was the expansion and remodeling of the 
foreign trainee programs in the early 1990s. These changes resulted not only in a 
prolongation of the sojourn of foreign trainees in Japan to up to three years, but also 
allowed SME to hire foreign trainees and “train” them. The foreign trainee programs 
are part of Japan’s official development assistance program. The scheme officially 
aims at training foreign workers in Japan in order to transfer skills and knowledge to 
developing economies and enhance their economic development. However, de facto, 
these new programs have become an undeclared guest worker policy. Some of the 
SME, which are shunned by Japanese workers due to their poor labor conditions, 
particularly use these trainee programs to gain access to cheap foreign labor. The 
number of foreign trainees has multiplied more than tenfold in recent years, rising 
from under 20,000 in the early 1990s to over 200,000 in 2008 (MOJ 1975–2011). 
Today, some industries, like the sewing industry, are structurally dependent on 
foreign trainees (Asahi Shimbun 2007/06/17).  
5. The Second Immigration Debate:  
Comprehensive Proposals and Minor Reforms 
When the latest economic downturn began in the early 1990s and the labor shortage 
consequently ended, immigration stopped being such an important topic in Japan 
(see Figure 2 and Table 1). However, the second immigration debate began to 
develop soon after that, namely in the late 1990s during the ongoing period of 
economic stagnation. In its intensive phase from 2004 to 2008, this second debate 
was marked by comprehensive reform proposals regarding immigration policy, 
which can truly be called revolutionary. However, the debates eventually ended with 
limited reforms concerning a more restrictive entertainer visa policy and the 
inclusion of health workers in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between 
Japan and Southeast Asian economies.  
Two ideational contexts framed the second immigration debate. On the one hand, 
new demographic prognoses made in the late 1990s showed that fertility would 
remain at a very low level in the long term. This would cause the size of Japan’s 
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population to drop sharply and lead to an imbalance in the total dependency ratio.5 
Hence, the starting point of the second immigration debate was the argument that 
Japan needed an active and open immigration policy in the long term in order to 
maintain its economic wealth and strength (Iguchi 2001: 10–14). This new argument 
changed the country’s perception of immigration: it was no longer a problem from 
abroad to which Japan had to react the same way it had done in the first immigration 
debate. In fact, immigration was now identified as a crucial element in Japan’s long-
term strategic development (Hirowatari 2005).  
On the other hand, public security became another important topic in public 
discussions. The widespread perception of rising crime and of falling clearance rates 
by the police led to a veritable “crime panic” in which the degree of decreasing 
public security was highly exaggerated (Hamai and Ellis 2006). Immigrants were 
identified as one of the main causes of rising crime rates. Foreign residents in 
general and the new immigrants of the late 1980s in particular had been regarded as 
a security issue ever since the early post-war era. From the late 1990s onwards, 
however, the identification of immigrants and foreign residents as a security threat 
reached a new level. This security perspective became the main argument against an 
active and open immigration policy in the second immigration debate. It was argued 
that an increase in immigration would lead to a breakdown of public security in 
Japan.  
However, both of the main discourses pro and contra an active immigration policy 
have serious shortcomings and neither reflect Japan’s current situation nor depict 
any future scenarios that can reasonably be expected in Japan. The demographic 
transformation is not reversible through immigration. Stopping Japan’s demographic 
transformation would mean keeping its dependency ratio constant or not letting it 
drop below a certain level. However, as the calculations of the United Nations 
Population Division show, such a policy is simply not sustainable in the long term 
(Table 2). In order to keep its dependency ratio constant, Japan would need approx. 
10.5 million new immigrants every year. This would result in a total population of 
over 800 million by 2050. To prevent its dependency ratio from falling below 3.0, 
Japan would still need about 1.9 million immigrants every year. Its total population 
would then reach nearly 230 million in 2050. These immigration policy scenarios 
are not feasible options. Moreover, as noted above, Japan is already structurally 
dependent on foreign labor. Immigration is not just a strategic policy of the future, 
but is already playing a strategic role in modern-day Japan. The security perspective 
and its arguments contra immigration are also a distortion of reality. Not only is the 
perception of rising crime rates completely exaggerated (a prime example of moral 
panic), but the view of foreign nationals being a major source of rising crime in 
                                                
5  The total dependency ratio indicates a population's share of working age population to non-working 
age population. The working age population is typically defined as those between 15 and 64 years of 
age. 
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Japan is not empirically supportable. The statistical evidence that is often presented 
in support of this argument is highly questionable, tending to be pseudo-evidence 
(Shipper 2005: 306–307; Yamamoto 2004: 41–47). 
Table 2: Population Projections for Japan, 2000–2050 (in thousands) 
 Annual number of immigrants needed 
Total number of 
immigrants, 2050 
Total population, 
2050 
Medium variant  
with no immigration  0 0 104,921 
Dependency ratio  
not below 3.0  1,897 94,837 229,021 
Constant  
dependency ratio 10,471 523,543 817,965 
Source: UNPD (2001: 55) 
Despite their weak empirical basis, both discourses have had a strong influence on 
public opinion. More recent surveys have shown that the majority of respondents are 
still in favor of admitting low-skilled foreign workers as well as highly skilled ones, 
especially in surveys framed in the context of demographic change (CAO 2004a; 
KKC 2004; see also CAO 2001 in Figure 4). However, crimes committed by 
immigrants are also perceived as a huge problem. According to a survey by a major 
Japanese newspaper in 2004, for example, over 70 percent of the respondents feared 
becoming a victim of a foreign criminal (Asahi Shimbun 2004/01/27; see also CAO 
2004b, 2007). 
In the main phase of the second immigration debate, some policy makers proposed 
fundamental and even revolutionary reforms in immigration policy. The following 
three proposals were the most comprehensive suggestions and show the amplitude 
of the debate. In 2006, a project team set up by the MOJ to focus on immigration 
policy under the leadership of Tarō Kōno (who served as Senior Vice Minister of 
Justice from 2005–2006) presented its final report (HFKGU-PC 2006). It 
highlighted the contradictions between Japan’s official immigration policy and the 
majority of foreign workers active in low-skill jobs. The project team recommended 
ending the exceptional treatment of nikkeijin and those parts of the foreign trainee 
programs that were being misused as guest worker programs. Instead, new 
categories of medium-skilled foreign workers ought to be included in the ICRRA, it 
said. Hence, Kōno’s project team simultaneously proposed closing all the side doors 
opened to low-skilled foreign workers and lowering the skill level of acceptable 
foreign workers. In 2007, a second proposal was formulated by Jin’en Nagase 
(2007), then Minister of Justice (he served from 2006 to 2007). He wanted to 
introduce a foreign guest worker program to replace the foreign trainee scheme. 
Foreign workers of all skill levels should be accepted as temporary workers for a 
maximum of three years if Japanese companies needed them, he said. Nagase 
therefore suggested terminating Japan’s basic principle in its official immigration 
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policy of accepting only highly skilled foreign workers. Even low-skilled foreign 
workers ought to be admitted as temporary laborers. In 2008, a group of some 80 
LDP parliamentarians advised by former bureaucrat Hidenori Sakanaka and under 
the leadership of the influential LDP politician Hidenao Nakagawa came up with an 
even more comprehensive proposal to change Japan into an immigration nation 
(LDP GKSGR 2008/06/12; see also Sakanaka and Asakawa 2007): in view of its 
shrinking population, Japan should accept ten million long-term immigrants over the 
course of the next 50 years. This opening of Japan to foreign workers and their 
families should be accompanied by a comprehensive integration policy. The main 
goal here was not to “import” qualified foreign workers, but to qualify them in Japan 
after their immigration. An initial goal that was to be achieved by 2025 was to 
accept one million students of all education levels. This policy proposal required a 
change of focus—from desired foreign workers to desired long-term immigrants. As 
was to be expected, other political actors and experts immediately criticized these 
three proposals in strong terms (Asahi Shimbun 2007/05/22; Koike 2009; Shūkan 
Shinchō 2008). Critics often pointed out that public security would be undermined 
by opening Japan up for immigration. Kunio Hatoyama, for example, who 
succeeded Jin’en Nagase as Minister of Justice in August 2007 (and served for 
approx. one year), made clear in his first press conference as minister that the 
introduction of a guest workers’ program had been Nagase’s private plan (Asahi 
Shimbun 2007/09/01). Hatoyama rejected the acceptance of low-skilled foreign 
workers, as it would lead to rising crime rates. Hence, he reintroduced a security 
perspective on immigration as new Minister of Justice.  
Despite comprehensive reform proposals and intense debates among policy makers, 
no major reform was finally realized during the second immigration debate because 
of opposing perspectives on immigration and an institutionally fragmented policy-
making process (Chiavacci 2011: 214–237). The main policy actors changed from 
ministries to politicians in the debate. However, the LDP and other important 
political parties are still split on immigration. In the end, the whole second 
immigration debate led to two limited reforms: first, foreign health workers were 
included in bilateral EPA with Southeast Asian countries, and second (and more 
importantly regarding the concepts of highly skilled foreign workers), a more 
restrictive entertainer visa policy was introduced.  
According to the ICRRA, the entertainer visa is a type of working visa intended for 
professional artists and athletes who have engagements in Japan. From the late 
1970s onwards, however, the large majority of foreign persons entered Japan with 
an entertainer visa and most of these were active in Japan’s large red-light districts 
(Figure 5). The most important country of origin by far for “entertainers” was the 
Philippines. The contradiction between the official regulations on entertainer visas 
in the ICRRA and the workplace of most foreign “entertainers” was a well-known 
one (Kajita 2001: 202–203; Sakanaka 2005: 72–95). The number of foreign 
“entertainers” entering Japan dramatically dropped in 1995/1996, for example, as 
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the law was implemented more rigorously by the authorities in Tokyo over this 
period (Figure 5). The number of “entertainers” increased again as of 1997, though, 
reaching a level of over 100,000 a year between 2000 and 2004.  
Figure 5: Foreign People Entering Japan with a Working Visa, 1976–2010 
Source: MOJ (1975–2011) 
This misuse of the entertainer visa was never a major issue in the first or second 
immigration debate. In 2004, however, it suddenly became an issue of the highest 
priority. Japan had already come under international pressure before this due to its 
entertainer visa policy, which was criticized as leading to human trafficking 
(Okamura and Ogasawara 2005: 4–5). In 2004, the U.S. Department of State (2004: 
96–97) put Japan on the watch list in its yearly report Trafficking in Persons because 
of the country’s lax entertainer visa policy, which was linked to the same type of 
abuse. This meant that Japan had to introduce new policy measures or it would be 
included in the 2005 report along with the small group of countries with policies that 
led to human trafficking, like North Korea and Myanmar. In view of this U.S. 
pressure, Japan promptly introduced new legislation and measures against human 
trafficking and also restricted its entertainer visa policy. This led to a steep drop in 
the number of foreign workers entering Japan with a visa of this kind (Figure 5). The 
contradiction between Japan’s official policy and actual immigration practice was 
therefore softened, at least in the case of the entertainer visa. Although the country’s 
immigration policy was generally marked by immobility during the second 
immigration debate, foreign-policy considerations did induce some limited reforms, 
as in the case of the EPA. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
According to the ICRRA and its official principles regarding immigration policy, 
Japan is a prime example of a participant in the “global war for talent.” It promotes 
and accepts only highly skilled foreign workers, and low-skill immigration is 
prohibited. However, underneath this neat surface of official statements, the reality 
is much more complex, exposing a gap between official rhetoric concerning the 
“global war for talent” and actual immigration practice. Reform debates on 
immigration policy are marked by contradictory notions of foreign workers’ value to 
the country, with many voices arguing in favor of admitting less-skilled foreign 
workers as well as highly skilled ones. The overwhelming majority of labor 
immigrants are not active in any of the professional categories defined by the 
ICRRA for foreign workers. Foreign “entertainers,” by far the most important 
category of foreign workers arriving with a working visa, worked in jobs that were 
in clear contradiction to official legislation. And finally, Japan’s leading export 
industries are structurally dependent on non-highly skilled foreign workers, not only 
SME with bad labor conditions that are shunned by native workers.  
These contradictions between official policy and real immigration are primarily due 
to side doors in immigration policy that have been opened over the last three 
decades. The most important side doors are open to foreign (pre-college) students, 
foreign entertainers, foreign trainees and nikkeijin. Hence, the gap in Japan is not 
between official immigration policy and actual immigration, but between official 
immigration policy and actual immigration policy. Some of the policies made to 
attract highly qualified workers had unintended effects. In other cases, the 
contradiction between theoretical policy and real development was quietly accepted. 
Nonetheless, it would be too simple to attribute this obvious contradiction to a long-
term, unofficial plan made by Japan’s policy makers. The story behind this gap is 
more complex than that; it is the result of an ideationally and institutionally 
fragmented policy-making process in which neither those in favor of accepting low-
skilled foreign workers nor those rejecting them were able to control and shape the 
policy-making outcomes.  
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